Iran Women’s Movement: A Decade Of Political Activism

Introduction

The death of Mahsa Amini on September 16th, 2022, arrested a few days earlier by Iran’s morality police for wearing an ill-fitting veil, ignited an unprecedented wave of popular dissent in Iran (Khatam, 2023). At a time when the regime’s violent repression in the face of the revolt no longer seems able to damper public unrest, it is clear that Iran’s social turmoil signals far-reaching structural mutations within its society. Although the scale, violence, and territorial reach of the 2022 protest constitute a significant turning point in the tumultuous history of the Iranian regime, recent acts of resistance and protest movements are far from representing a new feature of Iranian society (Uygur, 2022).

Iran post-1979 has been punctuated by a series of popular uprisings that repeatedly challenged the legitimacy of its successive leaders. From the repressive laws promulgated under the presidency of Mohammad Khatami, to the fight against Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s regime gruesome repression from 2009 onwards, to the uprisings of 2019 to 2022, Iranian history is one of perpetual contestation. As the tightening grip of authoritarianism led to the systematic suppression of women’s rights, they paradoxically emerged as pivotal figures of the organised political resistance. As a result of the revolution, urban women slowly moved away from private domestic life and took an increasingly important place in public spaces alongside men (Bayat, 1998). They have since become central figures of the various movements since the revolution and have since taken on an increasingly important role within Iranian civil society.

Since 2009, has the intensity of continuous political protests alongside escalating state repression indicated the demise of a unique politico-religious model? Furthermore, what role have women played in opening a new framework for activism aiming at advancing not only their rights, but those of Iranian society as a whole?

1.The rise of dissent

1.1 The emergence of new agents of change: women and the youth

The rise of an activist civil society in Iran is the byproduct of post-revolutionary widespread mutations of Iranian society (Ladier Fouladi, 2012). Subsequent changes in both the societal and familial structures reshaped traditional paradigms, enabling in the process two formerly silenced groups to access the political sphere: women and the youth.

In the aftermath of the revolution, the top-down Islamisation of Iranian society, from the civil code to criminal legislation, was complemented by an ambitious socio-economic development program. Indeed, with the streets clamouring for better living conditions, access to health care, and education in a bid to consolidate its newly acquired legitimacy, the Khomeini regime unwillingly participated in the rapid modernisation of Iranian society (Khatam, 2023). On the one hand, it contributed to the weakening of the patriarchal order and thus to the establishment of a new gendered-hierarchy, and on the other hand, the redefinition of traditional familial roles empowered young people to assert themselves as agents of change.

These developments are empirically quantifiable. Indeed, fertility rates in Iran fell drastically, from an average of 6.4 children per woman in 1986 to just 1.9 in 2011 (Ladier Fouladi, 2005). The democratisation of the use of contraceptive methods and women’s increasing control over their own fertility reflects the increasing willingness for independence of women all over Iran, as well as the slow erosion of the old man figure’s traditional hegemony over societal hierarchy. It further indicates the weakening of the patriarchal order, and with it its power over the family unit, in favour of a logic of growing autonomy for individuals. Moreover, this led to the reshaping of family sizes in general and intrafamilial relationship dynamics. In a similar manner, while the average age of marriage for young girls was 19.7 years old in 1976, it rose to 24 by 2006 (Ladier Fouladi, 2011). There are multiple explanations for this phenomenon, most notably the extension of young girls’ schooling period. It is also important to bear in mind that 40 percent of the Iranian population was under 40 in 2009. For the first time within households, young people are now studying for longer than their parents did, and are therefore better educated. This altered traditional hierarchy based on age within families to one based on knowledge, thus reshuffling the cards of the family structure (Giordano, 2011).

All these new changes foster a collective awareness of issues that were previously overlooked. Students were increasingly gathering in the face of the deteriorating economic conjuncture and rising unemployment. At the same time, campaigns calling for the repeal of discriminatory laws against women and for a general mobilisation against gender inequality, such as the million-signature campaign, were launched in August 2006 (Makaremi, 2023). Issues related to women’s rights and youth empowerment therefore slowly started  gaining momentum on the political stage. However, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s victory in the 2005 elections, marked the end of hopes for dialogue with the Iranian state (Maddah, 2010).

Despite the swift crackdown befalling new protesters, these societal mutations generated far reaching shifts altering the very fabric of Iranian society’s dynamics, structured around the rules of an order that now seems largely obsolete.

1.2 Women in Iran’s Green Movement

The Green Movement, established in the wake of the 2009 presidential elections, emerged from doubts about the legitimacy and transparency of the election that brought Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to power (Thiébaut, 2016). The massive participation of women within the Green Movement demonstrates the importance of the role they played early on in shaping civil society’s organised dissent. 

The advent of such a movement, unparalleled since the Islamic revolution, is remarkable not only because of its scale but also for the modernity of its means of action. Azadeh Kian-Thiébaut (2012), a Franco-Iranian sociology professor, describes the Green Movement as a “revolt without a revolution”. At the time, there was no intrinsic challenge to the Iranian regime within the movement, but rather a strong desire to reform the norms and practices of the Islamic Republic. The movement was attempting to rival the state’s institutions by transforming the protest into a genuine force for political opposition within the existing system. This can partly be explained by the persisting impact of the 1979 revolution’s memory, thus mitigating the resolution amongst protesters to reignite the damages caused by the precedent wave of mass demonstration and fueling a willingness to take a more peaceful path. This movement has led to the emergence of an urban middle class in Iran. At the top of the new hierarchy of modern knowledge, it enjoys high social prestige and particularly concerns itself with the inaccessibility of the political decision-making process (Kian-Thiébaut, 2012). Iran possesses a large middle class with 43 percent of its working population employed in the tertiary sector (Kian-Thiébaut, 2012). The Green Movement therefore includes liberal professions and civil servants, but seems to exclude workers and rural populations from its ranks. 

The Green Movement is furthermore an illustration of women’s crucial role in shaping elections in Iran. The mass demonstrations of young women prior to the 2009 elections prompted almost all candidates, besides the incumbent Ahmadinejad, to make public promises to improve women’s rights and status in Iran (Haghighatjoo, 2009). Women’s protests were not only a clear show of hatred against Ahmadinejad’s misogynistic presidency, but also carried the Green Movement’s demands for social, political, and legal reforms (Haghighatjoo, 2009). In the aftermath of Ahmadinejad’s fraudulent win, women took to the street and stood at the frontlines of protests and resistance to call for new elections. The movement’s demands were clear: first and foremost to turn the Iranian regime into a globally open democracy, thus dismantling the theocratic and authoritarian nature of the Islamic Republic (Kian-Thiébaut, 2012). The movement was neither secular nor particularly religious, but advocated for the combination of Islam with freedom and equality. The replacement of political power perceived as corrupt and arbitrary was therefore deemed necessary.

Indeed, Ahmadinejad’s term in office was characterised by a strong emphasis on security and powerful clientelistic networks. Paradoxically, despite the intensifying repression, the number of organised civil society associations continued to grow. In 2009, there were 28,000 non-governmental organisations, 800 of which were dedicated specifically to advocating for women’s rights (Kian-Thiébaut, 2012). Due to substantial government concessions, the Revolutionary Guards evolved into a quasi-autonomous entity within the state, coinciding with a rise in imprisonments and arrests (Djalili, 2007). Women’s rights activists were particularly targeted by the government’s repression as they took an important place amongst civil society organisations.

The absence of legislative progress resulting from the protests can be attributed to both the methods of action used and the absence of a unified, organised movement. In addition, the movement appeared fragmented, lacking a cohesive structure and accepted leadership, thereby failing to unite the rest of the Iranian population sharing its grievances.

2.The radicalisation of protest amid severe repression: from reform to revolution

2.1 From the margins to the centre of the political stage : women’s rights become a catalyst for national unity

Amid mounting repression, women grew increasingly organised and assumed leadership roles in the protest movement of 2009 and in the years that followed. Dozens of women activists were arrested and imprisoned on charges of undermining state security (Zerrouky, 2022). This had a strong unifying effect on the rest of Iranian protesters. 

On the one hand, the harsh repression legitimised the movement’s demands, with women becoming symbols of resistance to the regime. On the other hand, it brought together scattered demonstrations, the student movement joined the feminists and marched alongside the unions and workers. Moreover, women’s active participation in protests stood as a federative banner for broader societal grievances and aspirations for change while their presence on the front lines of demonstrations brought visibility to the movement’s goals. “Women, life, freedom” became the movement’s rallying cry, underscoring the centrality of matters related to women’s rights and freedom within criticisms directed at the regime (Ladier-Fouladi, 2022). 

Unlike the Green Movement, the federating effect of the feminist movement transcended socio-economic, political, or cultural lines, allowing for a greater degree of cohesion in what was now becoming a revolt. In 2014, the political landscape drastically shifted, with the reformist movement and its successor, the Green Movement, virtually stripped of their substance (Sadeghi-Boroujerdi, 2023). Against this backdrop, journalist and activist Masih Alinejad launched a new campaign, ‘My Stealthy Freedom’. This initiative gathered an existing network of militant women and represented a frontal criticism of the Islamic Republic’s legislation regarding mandatory veiling. The activist called on women in Iran to publicly protest by wearing a white headscarf on Wednesdays. While the ‘White Wednesdays’ campaign quickly gained momentum, its means of action grew more radical as the months went by. At the end of 2017, the image of 31-year-old Vida Movahed removing her headscarf and tying it to a stick in Revolution Street in Tehran quickly became emblematic. Arrested and sentenced to a year’s imprisonment, her act of rebellion was replicated by many other women who became known as the ‘Girls of Revolution Street’ (Piron, 2023).

These civil disobedience initiatives constituted a turning point in the very nature of the opposition movement. As repression intensified and the prospects of change through reform declined, direct confrontation with the state and civil disobedience emerged as the new dominant forms of action.

2.2 Protest coalesces around powerful symbols as the demands grow more radical

Between the 2017-2018 and 2019-2020 uprisings, slogans grew progressively more radical as the movement expanded, henceforth leaving no strand of population behind. The formerly peaceful Iranian protest movement now turned into a widespread insurrection.

Women’s struggles and decade-long activism quickly came to crystalise anti-regime anger and broader demands for democracy, justice, and freedom (Tajali, 2024). Grievances were now directly targeting the regime, the Supreme leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and its repressive organisations, the Bassidji and the Revolutionary Guards (Khosrokhavar, 2022). The evolution and radicalisation of the protests’ slogans is a particularly striking example of these changes. Several slogans illustrated how the oppression of women continued to be at the heart of the struggle, as “we are all Mahsa, come and fight”, “the cannons, tanks and rifles no longer work, tell my mother she has no daughter”, “I Will Kill, I Will Kill, Those Who Killed My Sister” could be heard in the streets of Tehran (Rojhelati, 2022). Others, however, called head-on for the end of the regime’s dictatorship and called for unity against the state’s attempts to create divisions along ethno-sectarian lines.

Furthermore, and in response to the regime’s intentional sectarianisation of dissent, the emergence of an overt anti-clerical dimension to the movement appeared to represent another significant transformation within the Iranian societal structure (Parsa, 2023). At the forefront of the protests, the youth were increasingly fighting against the conservative religious societal order inherited from the Islamic revolution they did not take part in. Protesters, however, didn’t reject faith itself, but rather the secular aspect of certain demands highlighted their desire to balance religious practice with freedom, away from state conservatism.

These challenges to the established Islamic moral order were once more crystalised by women’s rights as the movement calls for the abrogation of the highly discriminatory legislative framework regulating Iranian society (Serafini, Bazoobandi et al. 2023). Dislocating the state-sponsored structural discrimination thus involved the modification of the 1938 Civil Code. In January 2023, a large group of Iranian women gathered to publish the “Bill of Women’s Rights”. The document outlined eighteen articles to be included in the Constitution, covering a broad range of women’s issues, including political and social participation, education, health, family law, employment, and violence against women (Parsa, 2023). This demand for uncompromising gender equality and justice echoed the unwavering anger towards state sponsored political violence that has marked women’s path to seeking justice and accountability since the Revolution. Unfortunately, in Iran, the strengthening and persistence of civil disobedience and political dissent is systematically met with even more intense punishment. Faced with women’s unfaltering determination, the regime passed the hijab and chastity bill proposing harsher punishment to women defying the already exceptionally strict hijab laws, with women now facing up to ten years in prison (Parent, 2023). The prison sentence in the draft legislation was comparable to the incarceration period for murder or drug trafficking and amounts to gender apartheid according to the UN human rights office, thus violating every provision for women’s rights under international law. 

Conclusion

The Autumn 2022 demonstrations were just one phase of the social protest movement that has grown in Iran over the past couple decades since the 1979 revolution. Indeed, the establishment of the Islamic Republic created an environment conducive to societal change. Family structures and social norms evolved, giving rise to a vibrant civil society with the youth and women who had previously been marginalised as key players. While state violence grew increasingly brutal, with the number of arrests and people sentenced to death rising steadily, the protest movement soon came to encompass all strands of society regardless of social origin, ethnicity, religion, or gender. The entrenchment of the highly conservative moral order and the internationalisation of the Iranian cause resulted in the decline of what clearly appeared as an obsolete state system. 

The internationalisation of the Iranian movement has brought much legitimacy to women’s struggle. Streets around the world filled with protesters showing their support, while women and men of all nationalities were filmed shaving their heads in public squares in tribute to Mahsa Amini (Pierson, 2023). The wave of solidarity has also overwhelmed social media, where testimonies and videos are multiplying. However, former President Raïssi’s War on Women further strengthened the regime’s tight grip on power and ruthless gendered violence. The main obstacle facing Iranian society in the near future is likely the lack of an alternative and structured opposition to the regime. Although much remains to be done and the fight for Iranian women’s rights is far from behind won, the sheer magnitude of the support gathered by the protests on an international level acted as a strong symbol of the international community’s solidarity and dedication to women movements everywhere. While the recent election of Masoud Pezeshkian has brought much hope to women in the country, the latter’s endorsement of international law regarding women’s rights remains to be seen.

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