1. Introduction

The recent Russian invasion of Ukraine on the 24th of February 2022, is the latest and arguably most acute and confrontational challenge to the current international order. A revisionist attack and assault on its norms and values. The characterization of the Russo-Ukrainian war to be a conflict with revisionist ambitions is emblematic of an international system, by western media and academics have drawn parallels regarding the position and understanding of China and its relative nature as either a revisionist or status-quo oriented state.

This notion has only been compounded in the sense that the Chinese regime has not taken a clear stance towards the conflict, intentionally leaving its position ambiguous, with the refusal of recognizing the conflict as a Russian-led invasion of the sovereign state of Ukraine and the recent abstaining on a vote condemning the conflict in the United Nations. Furthermore, the developments in Ukraine are unsettling for the international system, alongside the parallels that exist between China’s political and territorial ambitions toward Taiwan in the South China Sea. To that extent, this article seeks to determine and understand the agenda and potential policy direction that Beijing may pursue while examining the restrictions and considerations that may dictate its future decisions.

2. Conflict of Interest

Beijing and Moscow have traditionally enjoyed a close relationship, both politically and militarily — while at the same time, the Chinese state has developed an increasingly strong economic relationship with the West. An approach and dynamic that has worked well for China, but that has now, unfortunately, placed the regime in an uncomfortable position to balance and be measured in its decisions and the political rhetoric of its leaders and officials.

The Beijing-Moscow relationship, a 99 paragraph long article published in February as part of a joint statement that covers ideological, political, and defensive agreements, has come to haunt the Chinese regime. The document which covers “shared positions on several global and regional issues” that China and Russia are orienting towards is reflective of a commitment to one another (Rajagopalan, 2022, The Diplomat). Furthermore, China is Russia’s largest trading partner, a relationship that since the invasion of Ukraine necessitated China to balance its economic and political interests with ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine. The financial sanctions imposed on Russia by Western states have highlighted to China the acute danger that associating too strongly with Russia will have on their economy, whereas the regime needs Russia as a partner to its “ongoing Belt-and-Road initiatives to build a massive international infrastructure of trade routes” (Snetkov & Lanteigne, 2022, The Conversation). The potential economic costs on either hand have meant that Beijing needs to tread carefully, and not step on the toes of either Russia or Western liberal democracies.

To this extent, in a recently measured and calculated statement published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, the ministry presented what it calls “China’s Five-Point Position on the Current Ukraine Issue”, with the intention of clarifying its stance (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2022). These five points are reflective of China’s approach to and pursuit of facilitating global governance and the sovereignty guarantees embedded in the UN Charter. The first point makes clear that China will continue to stand by its understanding of a policy of respecting and ensuring the sovereignty rules as enshrined in the UN charter. The second recognizes that the current confrontational environment in the international system is reflective of the cold-war era and that this needs to change for collective international security. While asserting that Russia, in the face of NATO’s expansion towards Eastern Europe has fostered a “legitimate security demands [that] ought to be taken seriously and properly addressed” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2022). The third point is a commitment to ensuring the safety and wellbeing of civilians caught in the conflict and asserting that restraint is needed in the current conflict to prevent further escalation. The final two points are indicative of China’s will that the conflict is resolved through diplomatic engagement by the two belligerent states and that the United Nations is a forum in which they may take place.

Overall, these five points are carefully crafted and pertain to China’s careful yet consistent support for the current international order in the sense of respecting the concept of sovereignty. However, the statement does offer justification for Russian actions in the wake of NATO expansion, while asserting a western emphasis on the wellbeing and treatment of civilians. Therefore, it can be determined that in the context of China’s economic goals and to ensure stability a policy of watch, look and listen is implemented before commenting on the conflict — and even then in a restrained and clinical manner.

3. China vs US strategy to end the conflict          

It has become clear that the two powerful entities have different strategies to end the war in Ukraine, and the situation tests shaky US-China relations. Xi’s position and Beijing’s point of view on the Russian invasion of Ukraine could define future ties with Washington. In fact, China condemns the western strategies against Russia. And in the same time, the Joe Biden administration and several top officials in the United States have discouraged China from backing Russia in its war in Ukraine.

In the same scope, the western alliances are worrying China, which is in a tricky position between the US that is trying to restore their links and their friendship with Russia, as Washington is not alone, but is backed by Europe, Japan, and many other countries and this triggers the Chinese economy and position.

On the other hand, and since the friendship between both Russia and China is said to be “rock solid”, “Beijing has refused to call Russia’s attack on Ukraine an invasion” and has decided to work on promoting negotiations between Ukraine and Putin, and is against resolving issues with sanctions, still less unilateral sanctions that lack the basis of international law.

The situation looks like China is trying to support Russia in a subtle way, without sending arms and at the same time working on keeping the Beijing-Europe relations stable at some point. So China has decided not to send anything triggering, such as military assistance, that would end up putting sanctions on them since Biden has warned Xi of a global backlash if China helps Russia’s attack on Ukraine and after a two-hour call between the American and Chinese President. President Jinping declared that China is not planning to send weapons to Russia and will not support the war and brutal campaign in Ukraine. And Biden “described the implications and consequences if China provides material support to Russia,” the White House said, even though Putin did ask for China’s help clearly as reported by the Pentagon.    

He seemed very convinced about aligning with the Biden administration’s demands and relied on global peace and security as his only concern. He affirmed not wanting the violence to accelerate in any way. Both officials declared wanting to collaborate for world peace and that “peace and security are what the international community should treasure most.”

        Beijing’s position is tricky at the time because Russia had specifically requested weapons from China, which thinks that a cease-fire is what is needed at this time. But Xi has already considered sending military aid to his allies. According Susan Thornton, a career diplomat with deep experience in Russia and China, and the former assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs for the Trump administration, tells U.S. News, Xi cannot turn around and be seen shipping weapons to Russia, after his clear statements.

4. Can China act as a peacemaker between Russia and Ukraine?

Since the beginning of the war, there has been a growing consensus that Beijing may play a critical role as a peacemaker between Ukraine and Russia. Indeed, besides the two parties directly involved in the conflict, also the US, NATO and the EU have recognized China as a potential mediator to resolve the war. Nevertheless, China’s stand on the Ukraine crisis has remained vague and contentious until now.

On the one hand, President Xi Jinping has shown his willingness to step in as a force for peace and stability. Indeed, on February 25th, in a phone call with President Putin, Xi Jinping exhorted him to settle the dispute with Ukraine by negotiation, in compliance with the principles of non-interference, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries (Lau, 2022, Politico). Furthermore, Beijing has repeatedly assured both western leaders and Ukraine President Zelensky of his interest in stopping the war through dialogue and negotiations (White, 2022, Financial Times).

On the other hand, China’s lack of a confident stand on the war, its severe criticism of the Western strategies to contain the crisis, as well as the growing Beijing-Russia “ironclad” friendship make Xi Jinping’s role as a peacemaker more questionable and less credible. In fact, even if China has not publicly supported Russia’s invasion, it has strongly supported Moscow’s complaints about NATO expansion, accusing the US-led NATO to have forced Russia and Ukraine’s tensions to a “breaking point” (Reuters, 2022, US News). Indeed, China’s political and economic ties with Russia advance together with the shared threat they perceive from the United States and the West, especially in terms of ideological confrontation between the two most powerful autocratic countries and the liberal democracies (Aboudouh, 2022, Atlantic Council). In this regard, while President Biden has recently threatened countermeasures should China decide to back Russia’s efforts in Ukraine, President Xi has repeatedly asserted that he will not allow the US to adopt coercive measures that would harm China’s interests.

While President Biden supports ejecting Russia from the G20 later this year, President Xi Jinping insists on taking the Ukraine crisis off the agenda, convincing Indonesia to invite Russia and maintain the summit’s discussion focused on global issues like international economic cooperation and climate change (Gordon, 2022, Fortune). As the Ukraine conflict deepens, China’s neutral stance becomes less feasible to the international community, and tensions are expected to rise unless China and the West adopt a common strategy to resolve the war.

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