The Price of Freedom: Examining Russia's Prisoner Exchange and its Human Rights Ramifications

Introduction

On August 1, the largest prisoner swap since Soviet times between the West and the Russian Federation took place at Ankara airport in Turkey, indicating a diplomatic channel that seemed to have faded due to the full-scale war in Ukraine. The total number of prisoners released from Russian jails was sixteen and included high-profile journalists and human rights activists, such as Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reporter Alsu Kurmasheva.

1 Details of the swap

The prisoner exchange was notably renamed by Russian political opponents as “The Navalny Exchange” given that, starting in late 2022, it was originally envisaged that the primary bargaining chip would be the now deceased Anti-corruption Foundation initiator Aleksei Navalny. The negotiation process was reported as being difficult, with Germany showing division on whether to release the FSB officer Vadim Krasikov and other participants expressing reluctance to be part of the swap. It was not until the end of  July that a plea deal was finally reached for the detainees to gain their freedom under the auspices of Turkey, which served as mediator throughout the arduous process. 

1.1 Prisoners and Accusations

With this exchange, the Russian Federation traded eight high-profile nationals held in foreign territories for sixteen prisoners, including thirteen compatriots, making the move unique in its nature. Firstly, Evan Gershkovich, a Wall Street Journal columnist with dual American and Russian citizenship, was accused last March in Ekaterinburg of espionage charges and sentenced to sixteen years in a high-security penal colony. Secondly, Alsu Kurmasheva, a Russian-American journalist working for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, was detained in October 2023 for spreading “false information” because of a book collecting accounts of Russians on the war in Ukraine. Thirdly, Vladimir Kara-Murza, an outspoken Russian critic, was jailed in April 2023 for twenty-five years under a “strict regime” in a “correctional colony” on charges of accusing the Kremlin of committing war crimes in Ukraine, notably for releasing cluster bombs on civilian populations. Fourthly, Ilya Yashin was sentenced in late 2022 to eight and a half years on accusations of spreading fake news — that is, for decrying human rights violations committed by the Russian military in Bucha. Fifthly, vocal human rights activist and co-chair of Nobel Peace Prize-winning Memorial organization Oleg Orlov, was arrested at the beginning of 2024 for labelling Russia a fascist state in an opinion paper published by French media criticizing its actions on the battlefield in Ukraine. Sixthly, former territorial coordinator of Navalny’s organisation in Ufa (central Russia) Lilia Chanysheva, was placed in pre-trial detention for two months and sentenced to nine and a half years for establishing and leading an extremist organisation. The same fate befell Ksenia Fedeyeva, seventhly, who was detained, put under house arrest, tried behind closed doors, and sentenced to nine years in prison for her involvement in Navalny’s activities in Tomsk (South-West of Siberia), even though she had ceased her association with Navalny’s organisation before it was designated as extremist. Eighthly, Sasha Skochilenko, a Saint-Petersburg singer-songwriter deemed by Amnesty International as a “prisoner of conscience”, was sentenced to seven years for protesting the invasion of Ukraine by substituting five price tags in a grocery store with information about the war, also countering the euphemistic label of “special military operation” given by the Kremlin to the conflict. Ninthly, Kevin Lik, a nineteen-year-old dual German-Russian citizen, was sentenced to four years in jail for handling photographs of Russian army deployment sites to a “representative of a foreign state”; he became the youngest person charged with treason in Russian modern history. Tenthly, Russian political opponent Andrei Pivovarov, was sentenced to four years in jail for his involvement in the outlawed and now disbanded pro-democracy organisation Open Russia. Eleventhly, Dieter Voronin, convicted on treason charges and sentenced to thirteen years and three months in prison for assisting the imprisoned journalist Ivan Safronov. Twelfthy, Herman Moyzhes, a dual Russian-German national and lawyer, was incarcerated for aiding Russians in obtaining EU residency permits. Thirteenthly, Vadim Ostantin, like others in the prisoner exchange, was charged with being an opposition campaigner and serving as former head of Aleksei Navalny’s branch in Barnaul (southeast of Siberia).

1.2 The Kremlin’s Stance

Despite the long-awaited event being largely welcomed in the international community as a victory of soft power, doubts about whether Russia will respect the terms set out in the agreement have emerged in large numbers. On the same day,  the Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev commented on the swap on Telegram by affirming that traitors should pick up new names and actively disguise themselves under witness protection programmes, thus suggesting that the Kremlin possesses all the necessary means to neutralise its opponents on foreign territories.

1.3 Discrepancy Between Domestic and International Law

This prisoner swap is indicative of the increasingly shrinking civic space throughout the region. Article 10 under the European Convention on Human Rights (corresponding to Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights), which enshrines the freedom of expression, is under threat due to a continuous clampdown on alternative, anti-government, and anti-war views of citizens. Individuals have the right to hold any opinion and to impart and receive information without interference from public authorities. However, the Foreign Agent law (№. 255-f3), approved in July 2022 by the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, requires all natural and juridical persons (regardless of nationality) “receiving support” or “being under influence” from outside Russia to register and declare themselves as “foreign agent,” which de facto translates to stricter control and harsher restrictions on legitimate activities. This law was criticised by human rights advocates for violating democratic principles, as so far, it has primarily been used to suppress political dissent against the war and current political class. The law’s few exceptions include religious organisations, political parties, employers associations, and chambers of commerce that are “registered in accordance with the procedure established by law,” in addition to conventional public authorities that have direct connections with the government but have proven to be theoretical.

2 Barriers to Just Information

An analysis of the charges brought against the Russian nationals involved in the swap reveals a recurring pattern: allegations of disseminating fake news, espionage, extremism, and treason — suggesting that the Kremlin is adhering to a rhetoric reminiscent of Soviet times. The Roskomnadzor, the federal agency established in 2008 to supervise communications, information technology, and mass media within the Federation, has long maintained strict control over the media landscape, effectively serving as a state-operated censorship body. Within this framework, the rhetoric employed by the sanctioned media is uniform, with a narrative regularly controlled and shaped by the Kremlin, which warrants the label of propaganda for the press. 

2.1 Critical Analysis of Gershkovic’s Media Representation
A prime example of state-sponsored propaganda can be found in Komsomolskaja Pravda, a national daily newspaper that presented the first prisoner on the list, Evan Gershkovich, with a blend of biographical details and a brief overview of his career. The article highlights his arrest by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) on March 30, 2023, on charges of espionage while he was conducting research in the Urals to collect information on the military-industrial complex. Mr. Gershkovich’s establishment as a journalist in prominent newspapers, such as The New York Times, The Economist, and ultimately The Wall Street Journal, raised suspicions about his credentials as a journalist given that in the United States, he obtained degrees in linguistics and philosophy but received no journalistic training. The only prior journalistic experience Mr. Gershkovich had was with a dubious non-governmental organisation focused on environmental protection located in Asia, whose name (according to an interview he gave to Bowdoin College) was not disclosed. Due to his migrant descent, Mr. Gershkovich is portrayed as an “asobij chelovek” (special person), a perfect Russian speaker with strong ties to Western media and significant leadership skills, widely recognised as an “expert on Russia”. 

In this article, Mr. Gershkovich appears to have been part of an elite group, as evidenced by his background in the United States, where his family could afford a $60,000 college education, as well as his life in Moscow, where he enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle. His apartment, shown in a video released during the COVID-19 pandemic, is indicative of his financial status, featuring high ceilings and renovations typical of Stalinist-era housing. His The Economist publication, “The Kremlin has isolated Russia’s economy,” which is referenced in the article, brought him to Perm, a significant hub for the military industry, where he spoke with representatives of the ultra-liberal opposition and discussed the Kremlin’s economic strategy. This strategy has aimed to protect Russia from external economic shocks, such as sanctions or fluctuations in oil prices, while fostering stagnation and growing opposition movements within the country. The article highlights that Gershkovich  deems this strategy unsustainable, concluding with his statement: “There is no future in the fortress.”

Later, Mr. Gershkovich was in Tallin to investigate the rise of radical sentiments in the Republic. However, rather than addressing the reported Russophobia among Neo-Nazis in the Baltic, he criticized Estonians for their aversion to migrants and feminists. Following the start of the special military operation, Mr. Gershkovich published a series of “peculiar articles” on the conflict in Ukraine, but although it is impossible to verify the “journalistic insider” information (every pro-American reader would likely agree with this remark), this “Hollywood-style Kremlinology” has nonetheless resonated with the western audience, garnering considerable attention despite its controversial nature.

In examining this article, it becomes clear how propaganda techniques can distort the original information: the imprisonment of Mr. Gershkovich was based on charges unsupported by credible evidence — charges that constitute clear violation of international human rights law. The frequent use of euphemisms to minimize the gravity of government actions, such as referring to the war as a “special military operation,” alongside the creation of oversimplified narratives pitting Russians against Americans, is particularly noticeable. The author references the United States right from the title, “The ideal spy from the USA,” and further defines the relations between the two countries by describing the Russian language as “the language of the USA ‘probable enemy’”. Later, when discussing the “peculiar articles” Mr. Gershkovich wrote after the conflict in Ukraine began, the American journalist’s style is characterized as sensationalist “Hollywood-style Kremlinology,” suggesting it is a fictional narrative crafted to captivate Western audiences.

Another notable element is the depiction of victimization and encirclement, which seems to serve the purpose of diverting attention from the Kremlin’s repressive policies. Mr. Gershkovich’s arrest on charges of espionage frames his presence in Russia not as an act of legitimate journalism but as an alleged attempt to uncover state secrets. The article redirects attention from sensitive matters for the Russian government, notably its actions in Ukraine, to issues that could reflect negatively on its adversaries — such as claims that the “spy” reported on relatively minor topics like migration and feminism while omitting the allegations of Russophobia in the Baltic states. The piece also appeals to the migration issue, an issue of significant sensitivity in Russia due to the recent influx of migrants from Uzbekistan. Furthermore, it attempts to undermine Mr. Gershkovich’s credibility through dismissive language, portraying him as part of an affluent American elite and citing his college education and the luxurious apartment shown in a video during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Finally, the article in Komsomolskaja Pravda illustrates a recurring pattern of information selection  — extracting details without providing the necessary context, resulting in biased and incomplete narratives that serve to reinforce the Kremlin’s rhetoric. This is particularly evident in its interpretation of Mr. Gershkovich’s 2021 publication in The Economist. Gershkovich’s article analyzed Russia’s economic isolation strategy, known as the “fortress economy,” supported by data, charts, and factual indicators. He argued that while this strategy shielded Russia from external economic shocks, it also contributed to economic stagnation and social unrest due to diminished growth prospects and increased isolation. His analysis covered various aspects of the Russian economy, including debt levels, technological and cyber strategies, reliance on hydrocarbons, and societal discontent. However, Komsomolskaja Pravda reduces this nuanced critique to a simplified caricature, portraying it as a baseless attempt by a foreign “spy” to destabilize Russia internally, thus downgrading it to mere propaganda. 

Conclusion
The recent prisoner exchange has led to the release of several individuals unjustly imprisoned. However, it also raises concerns about those who remain behind bars, facing unfounded charges simply for speaking out against a regime that presents itself as a democracy. The exchange, in conjunction with the Kremlin’s orchestrated propaganda, may signal an attempt to open a diplomatic channel amidst strained relations with the West. Alternatively, it could be viewed as a strategic manoeuvre aimed at de-escalating tensions and securing further concessions in negotiations with Ukraine. The outcome remains uncertain, as does the future of relations with what the Kremlin refers to as the “collective West”. The foreign agent law, alongside the continued use of charges such as spreading false information, espionage, extremism, and treason to suppress dissent, underscores fundamental divergences between Western and Russian interpretations of democracy, particularly regarding human rights and freedom of expression. While this political exchange holds symbolic significance for human rights advocates and has led to the release of some political prisoners, it is crucial for the international community to monitor Russia’s subsequent actions to assess the sincerity of this gesture.

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