Migration Beyond the EU: Externalisation of Borders and Raising Concerns

Introduction

Ten years ago, between 2014 and 2015, almost a million people crossed the Mediterranean en mass to reach Europe (Martini, Megerisi, 2023). This year, on April 10^th, the European Parliament voted to approve the new European Union (EU) Pact on Migration and Asylum with the goal of reforming the current European asylum system via ten new legislative files (IRC, 2024). The Pact, which will enter into force after a two-year transition period, has been heavily criticised by NGOs for failing to address and reduce pressures on states of first entry, unlawful pushbacks, and human rights violations (IRC, 2024).

In the early 2000s, with the progressive reduction of legal pathways for third-country migrants to live and work in Europe (and yet no substantial reduction in demand) smuggling networks established themselves as effective ‘service providers.’ Thus, when in 2011 the ‘Arab Spring’ inflamed the MENA region, the system was already in place, ready to provide alternatives to the succumbing European procedures (Martini, Megerisi, 2023).

Following the 2015 ‘migration crisis’, EU Member States progressively enhanced their tools both to reduce arrivals at their doorsteps and to avoid legal responsibility under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and their respective domestic laws. Therefore, they began to implement migration policies strictly through two pillars: securitisation (migration is seen solely as a security threat) and externalisation (border management is devolved to southern Mediterranean countries) (Tammone, 2024).

Initially successful in reducing arrivals towards Europe, externalisation policies have proved themselves impractical in the long term and unable to curb irregular flows or deaths at sea (quite the opposite, in fact) (Open Migration, 2016). Despite this, the EU continues to pour millions of euros into North African authoritarian regimes (not so different from the pre-2011 ones). This not only makes the EU lose credibility vis à vis both its electorate and the north-African population (Roggero, 2024), but fosters an unbalanced relationship with the EU’s southern neighbourhood, in which development funds are used strategically as incentives or penalties for the country’s performance on interception, deportation, and repatriation procedures (Lopez Curzi, 2016).

Against this background, the article will try to detangle the intricacy of externalisation policies in the North African nexus, with a focus on the eastern, western, and central Mediterranean routes and their impact on migrants’ fundamental rights.

The Ratio Behind Externalisation Policies

It was 2012 when the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgement on the Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy case: by repatriating the applicants (Somalian and Eritrean citizens held in custody on an Italian Navy ship) to Libya, Italy was found in breach of both Article 3, regulating the prohibition of torture, and 4 of Protocol No. 4, prohibition of collective expulsions (Tammone, 2024).

Following this judgement, the practice of pushbacks was gradually replaced by the one of pullbacks. While the first was usually performed by the authorities of the country of destination (i.e., a European State), the second is now being carried out by third countries, either of origin or transit, that operate as ‘proxies’ (Tammone, 2024). This competence is often delegated through unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral agreements (Frelick et al, 2016) with third parties – either governments, international organisations, or private entities (Spagnolo, 2017). The content of such provisions goes from preventive policies and direct interdiction to indirect technical and financial support (Frelick et al, 2016). Additionally, the notion of ‘safe third countries’ – according to which transit or first arrival countries can grant refuge to those seeking it, therefore making it unnecessary to reach Europe – is often exploited, and ultimately appointed to states where rights are not secured (Frelick et al, 2016).

The intent is, ultimately, not only to prevent migrants from physically reaching Europe but also to avoid jurisdiction and therefore legal responsibility (Tammone, 2024). Understandably, this raises concerns for the respect of migrants’ rights and for determining who is responsible when violations occur (Tammone, 2024; Spagnolo, 2017).

Overall, externalisation policies have proven unable to cut arrivals beyond the short term and to serve as a deterrent for departures (despite making the journey more expensive, unsafe, and uncertain); they have also not equipped Europe with a better control over its entering routes; they have, though, progressively modified Brussels’ approach towards its southern neighbourhood, now a ‘buffer zone’ where all partnerships revolve around security and migration and where authoritarian leaders can use refugees as leverage (Martini, Megerisi, 2023).

The EU-Maghreb bloodiest migration deals

As stated, the 2015 ‘migration crisis’ reached its peak when 855,000 people, mainly Syrians and Iraqis, crossed from Türkiye to Greece; in response, Brussels made a much-criticised €6 billion deal with Türkiye (March 2016) to curb arrivals and process refugee claims outside of its territories (Martini, Megerisi, 2023). Seeing a decline in arrivals along this route (partially because of the effective implementation of the deal, partially because flows eased naturally), this agreement became the blueprint for many others along the Central and Western Mediterranean, where numbers had started to spike (Lopez Curzi, 2016).

Indeed, 2016 was a record year for arrivals from Libya to Italy. Despite being sanctioned on the Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy case, Italy carried on, and extended, its partnership with Libya – initially established in August 2008 under the Gaddafi Regime (Lopez Curzi, 2016). In February 2017 the two countries agreed upon a new Memorandum of Understanding – renewed in 2020 and then again in 2023 – directed at reducing irregular crossings both by returning to Libya migrants found at sea and by enhancing the Libyan Coast Guard’s capabilities (Tranchina, 2023). Since then, Italy has set aside €32.6 million for international missions to support the Libyan Coastguard (MSF, 2022), while the EU issued another €57.2 million under the “Integrated Border and Migration Management in Libya” (Tranchina, 2023).

By 2018, arrivals from the Central Mediterranean route had decreased by almost 100,000; the deal seemed to have worked. However, just as it had happened with Türkiye, flows were redirected and moved to the Western Mediterranean route, with arrivals from Morocco more than doubling in the same year (Martini, Megerisi, 2023). In addition, as the Italy-Libya Memorandum did not directly involve eastern Libya (under the control of the House of Representatives and General Khalifa Haftar), departures from there quickly resurged in 2020. Overall, as agreements with militias, warlords, and unrecognised groups fostered instability within the country, by 2023 the number of departures from Tunisia and Libya (mainly eastern) started to return to the levels of 2014-2016 (Martini, Megerisi, 2023).

Unsurprisingly, deals with Libya have also resulted in thousands of documented cases of human rights violations: men, women and children migrating through the country are trafficked, detained, exploited, and tortured to extort money from their families (MSF, 2022). In this journey, often described as “hell” (OHCHR, 2016), torture and crimes against humanity are perpetrated by state authorities and affiliated entities, the Libyan Coast Guard, along with militias and independent criminal groups (OHCHR, 2023).

With regards to neighbouring Tunisia, the country remains one of the primary departure points for Sub-Saharan Africans (and Tunisians alike) to reach Europe. Because of this, between 2016 and 2020 it received more than €37 million from the EU Trust Fund for Africa for the ‘management of migration flows and borders’ (Migration Control, 2023). But, despite this deal and many other bilateral agreements with Italy (1998, 2009, 2011 and 2017), yet another conflict in Libya in 2019 caused migrants to flee over the borders with Tunisia (Martini, Megerisi, 2023) and soon the eastern city of Sfax became a migration hub. More recently, in July 2023, a new Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the EU and Tunisia: within the broader context of sustainable development Brussels immediately pledged €105 million (out of a total €1.1 billion) to refine Tunisia’s border management capacities (Roggero, 2024).

According to the IOM, the Central Mediterranean is the deadliest known migration route in the world, with more than 17,000 deaths and disappearances since 2014 (IOM, 2024).

Moving onto the Western Mediterranean route (here referring to arrivals both in the south of Spain and in Canary Islands), a resurgence in flows was registered in 2018, and then again in 2022 and 2023, concomitant with the implementation of deals along the central Mediterranean route and political instability in the Sahel (Al Jazeera, 2024).

Firstly, the relationship between the EU and Morocco is an increasingly transactional one: as the EU fears migration-related security threats, Rabat anguishes over Western Sahara and attempts to exploit its geographical advantages to shape the EU’s stances on the question (as done in 2021 with the engineered migration scheme into Ceuta) (Fernández-Molina, 2024).

Secondly, if a deal with Morocco might be soon on the table, one with Mauritania has already been signed. In March 2024 Brussels and Nouakchott agreed upon a €210 million migration deal to support the country’s border and security forces. With the goal of reducing smuggling and trafficking, the agreement was pushed by Spain after an unprecedented peak of departures towards the Canary Islands (Tamburini, 2024). Indeed, the IOM registered more than 19,700 arrivals between January and July 2024, a tremendous 160 percent increase compared to the same period last year (Al Jazeera, 2024).

Once again, Brussels finds itself collaborating with a State that has not fully embraced democracy, where human rights are neglected, minorities (both political and ethnic) are discriminated against, and ultimately where a military coup remains a possibility (Tamburini, 2024).

Conclusions

UN High Commissioner for Refugees expects that more than 130 million people will be displaced by the end of 2024 (IRC, 2024; Woolrych, 2024); even though most of them will remain in their own regions, the lack of safe pathways to access the EU asylum system makes it impossible not to rely on illegal networks (Woolrych, 2024). Busy in the fight against irregular migration, European States have stopped caring about migrants’ fundamental rights (Tammone, 2024).

In 2022 European countries have managed to welcome circa five million Ukrainians, proving that a rights-based, collaborative, and balanced approach to asylum can work (Woolrych, 2024). Although, little has changed under the newly approved Migration Pact, which implemented the outsourcing of asylum processing, fast-track asylum and return procedures, and an increased number of detention centres (Woolrych, 2024).

Europe must stop treating migration as a crisis, and finally approach it as the long-term, structural phenomenon that it is (Roggero, 2024). Firstly, Brussels needs third-country deals that bring together short-term needs and long-term strategies, such as visa schemes and additional legal routes (Martini, Megerisi, 2023). Moreover, the disproportionate burden placed on first-entry states must be alleviated with a definitive and effective quota system – something that, yet again, is missing from the New Migration Pact (Woolrych, 2024). Finally, Europe needs to embrace third-country populations’ concerns with galloping authoritarianism and support their struggle for democracy and rule of law, rather than keep on reinforcing the status quo with economic aid and diplomatic support (Roggero, 2024).

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